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There has been a consensus in the U.S. for a number of 
years that rapid economic development in friendly or neutral 
countries promoted our national interests. Economic aid has 
been an important part of this promotion since World War II. 
Over time the philosophy and mix of aid activities have 
changed substantially (Mikesell). Technical assistance, 
institution building, training, food commodities, and trade 
concessions played a much larger role in assistance during 
the SOs and 60s than they have the past decade. Increas-
ingly, large capital loans have come to dominate the aid 
basket. 
Various cross currents of interests in foreign aid 
often obscure the principal purpose that causes giver and 
receiver to be involved in aid. Namely, that the aid helps 
to accelerate the rate of economic growth in the receiving 
country, helps to ease at least some of the poverty there, 
and also results in less turbulent societies. In the 
discussion that follows, I argue that large amounts of donor 
assistance too often helps to sustain policies that retard 
growth, further distort income distributions, and also cause 
more turmoil in low income countries • 
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Criticisms of Aid 
Since the early 1970s it has become increasingly dif-
ficult to find aid success stories, and too easy to identify 
countries where economic conditions have deteriorated. If 
economies had nervous breakdowns, many of the low income 
countries would be on the "shrinks" couch. There are 
several explanations for this scarcity of recent development 
success stories: energy price increases, rapid population 
growth, declines in the prices of major exports, droughts, 
and wars. Even more commonly, incorrect economic policies 
have brought third world countries to their knees. 
I continue to feel that foreign aid can be useful, 
despite its shortcomings. My concern is with the current 
mix of activities, and especially with the large amounts of 
assistance that may be causing ~ of the current distress 
experienced in low income countries. The problems with this 
assistance lie in three related areas: large amounts of 
food aid allow governments to sustain low food price 
policies; large amounts of capital assistance, complemented 
by additional commercial loans, may allow governments to 
postpone making adjustments in foreign exchange rate poli-
cies to the point where major instead of minor adjustments 
are necessary; and much of the aid that goes to countries in 
financial form moves through local financial markets. This 
aid may reinforce financial policies that cause misalloca-
tion of resources, cause further income and asset ownership 
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concentration, and also undermine the vitality of the finan-
cial market itself. 
Recent events in Egypt, Costa Rica and the Dominican 
Republic illustrate how large amounts of foreign aid have 
been associated with damaging policies. 
Egyptian Agricultural Prices 
A major anomaly in economic policies is that high 
income countries often maintain price supports on agri-
cultural products that result in excess production and 
disposal programs, while many of the low income countries 
set price ceilings on major agricultural products that 
discourage production and force the country to import 
substantial amounts of food. These policies, combined with 
population increases, have resulted in many low income 
countries becoming increasingly dependent on high income 
countries for food. For the past couple of decades some 
students of development have been concerned with the impact 
of large amounts of commodity imports under P.L. 480 
programs on farmers' prices in aided countries (Schultz, 
1960, for example). Despite these criticisms large amounts 
of food aid continue to make up a significant part of the 
assistance given to some low income countries. 
One of the largest recipients of food aid is Egypt. 
During the past couple of decades it has increasingly 
depended on food imports. In part, this is due to faltering 
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growth in yields and switching by farmers from the produc-
tion of major commodities such as cotton and wheat to vege-
tables, fruits, and livestock. 
Egypt's agricultural growth rates in recent years have 
lagged behind population growth rates, and this has forced 
the country to import 70 percent of all wheat used and to 
allow food imports to make up more than one-quarter of the 
value of all imports (Scobie). As can be noted in Table 1, 
Egypt's cereal imports, most of which are wheat, have 
roughly quadrupled since the early 1960s. At the same time 
the volume of cotton exports, a very important source of 
foreign exchange, was less than half in 1980 of the early 
1960s volume. It can also be noted that the ability of 
Egypt to pay for its food imports through agricultural 
exports has fallen, especially since 1972. In 1978 the 
value of agricultural imports, mostly food, was almost three 
times as large as the total value of agricultural exports. 
In contrast, the value of agricultural exports in the early 
1960s was about double the value of food imports. 
Increasingly, Egypt is loosing the ability to feed itself. 
For those who understand the role that prices play in 
farmers decisions, one does not have to look far to find an 
explanation for Egypt's food problems. For a number of 
years the governments of Egypt have maintained price 
controls, imposed forced sales to the government and over-
valued exchange rates that result in average farm gate 
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Table 1. Egypt's Agricultural Imports and Exports, 1960-1980 
Cotton ExEorts Cereal ImEort~/ Wheat Im;eortsE/ Value Ratios of 
Thousand Million Million Million Million Million Ag. Imports/ Ag. Exports/ Ag. Imports/ 
M.T. $ M.T. $ M.T. $ Total Imports Total Ex;eorts Ag. Exports 
1960 374 387 1.4 76 1. 3 71 .32 .81 .4 s 
1962 22S 208 1.8 117 1.6 102 .33 • 71 .90 
1964 291 268 2.3 171 1.9 143 .33 • 73 .81 
1966 348 330 2.4 161 2.3 lSO .31 .71 • 77 
1968 269 276 2.4 144 2.3 136 .37 .70 • S7 
1970 28S 340 1.3 70 1.2 66 .27 .6 7 .41 
1972 29S 373 1. 8 119 1. 7 114 .31 .61 .SS 
1974 232 714 3.0 739 2.6 670 .Sl .6S 1.22 
1976 16S 396 3.4 S64 2.9 486 .36 .48 l.8S 
1978 133 336 S.9 804 s. 1 706 .29 .38 2.98 
1980 148 423 6.0 1,140 S.4 l ,03S N/A N/A N/A Ul 
al Mainly wheat and corn. 
b/ Includes wheat products in raw wheat equivalents. 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Trade Yearbook, various issues. 
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prices being far below prices that prevail in international 
markets. In recent years the government has sold primary 
agricultural commodities to consumers at prices that are 
even lower than those paid to farmers. Recently, food sub-
sidies equaled about 20 percent of all government revenues, 
and the subsidies for wheat and wheat flour alone came to 10 
percent of government revenues (Scobie). 
As can be noted in Table 2, the price distortions were 
especially large for cotton and rice with producers 
receiving less than one-quarter of the international price, 
using market rates of exchange for the Egyptian pound. 
Producers of other major agricultural products, including 
wheat, received only from 40 to 66 percent of the world 
market price. It is no surprise that farmers have shifted 
out of the production of goods with price controls to 
enterprises that do not carry these price disincentives. 
As El-Amir and others reports, the terms-of-trade for 
wheat and corn have been more seriously affected by pricing 
policy than is true of rice or cotton, especially since 
1973-74. This is no accident. Major imports of both wheat 
and corn, partly funded by P.L. 480 and partly by foreign 
assistance, began in 1973-74. The decline in the terms-of-
trade for these two commodities is clearly associated with 
the increase in the imports of these two goods. It is 
highly unlikely that Egypt would have been able to maintain 
these low food prices and turn the terms-of-trade against 
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Table 2. External and Internal Prices for Major Agricultural 
Products in Egypt, 1980 
International 
Prices Using 
Exchan9:e Rate* Internal Prices Ratios 
Paid to Paid by 3 3 4 
Product Market Official Farmers Consumers y 2 y 
( 1) (2) (3} (4} ( 5} (6} ( 7} 
-In Egyptian Pounds Per Metric Ton- -Ratios-
Rice 320 269 75 50 .23 .28 .16 
Wheat 133 112 77 41 .58 .69 .31 
Sugar 436 366 177 100 .41 48 .23 
Beans 243 204 161 100 .66 .79 .41 
Lentils 441 370 250 110 .57 68 .25 
Cotton 959 806 230 333 .24 .29 .35 
* In 1980 the market exchange rate of one U.S. dollar was .84 
Egyptian pounds, while the official exchange rate was .70. 
Source: Adapted from Strategy for Accelerated Agricultural 
Development Team, "Egyptian Agricultural Policy: 
Diagnosis and An Adjustment Agenda". An unpublished 
report prepared for the Agency for International 
Development in Egypt, Cairo, Egypt, April 15, 1982. 
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(8) 
.19 
.37 
.27 
.49 
.30 
.41 
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wheat and corn producers without the availability of large 
amounts of foreign food assistance. 
Costa Rican Exchange Rates 
Recently, a number of low income countries have 
undergone economic stress due to increases in the costs of 
energy imports, worldwide and internal inflation, and 
declining prices for principal exports. Costa Rica is a 
particularly interesting case to study because it has been, 
until recently, an island of stability and democracy in a 
Central American sea of turmoil.!/ In late 1981 Costa Rica 
was forced to announce a moratorium on payment of foreign 
debt. Soon its exchange rate for dollars shot up from less 
than 9 colones per dollar to over 50; it experienced 
substantial foreign capital flight; it incurred triple digit 
inflation; it had negative rates of economic growth; and it 
was forced into the clutches of the International Monetary 
Fund. This was a tremendous shock for a country that had 
realized economic growth rates of around 6 percent per year 
since the early 1960s and had been classified as an 
excellent credit risk by commercial banks and aid donors 
(Cespedes and Gonzalez-Vega). 
The roots of these problems can be traced to events in 
the mid-to-late 1970s. In 1976-79 the price of coffee, a 
major export of Costa Rica, was relatively high, along with 
!/ I am indebted to Claudio Gonzalez-Vega for background 
material, insights and interpretations of what went on in 
Costa Rica over the past few years. 
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prices on other principal exports. As can be noted in Table 
3 the value of Costa Rica's exports increased about 60 per-
cent in 1977 over 1975. At the same time, the international 
banking system had large amounts of deposits from petroleum 
producing countries they were recycling back into non-oil 
producing countries such as Costa Rica. From 1973 to 1979 
Costa Rica increased its public sector foreign debt by about 
a half-billion dollars through these commercial sources 
(Table 3). Along with this, the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and other donor agencies, between 
1975 and 1980, added about 700 million dollars to Costa 
Rica's public sector external debt. Private external debt 
also increased rapidly during this period and amounted to 
another billion dollars U.S. in 1982. 
While this was going on, the Costa Rican government 
expanded employment and expenditures in public and semi-
public agencies. Instead of cutting back on public expen-
ditures when export earnings leveled off after the boom in 
the late 1970s, the Costa Rican government continued to 
borrow large amounts in external markets, as well as within 
the country through the nationalized banking system. These 
loans were used to cover growing internal budget deficits. 
Massive government borrowing increasingly crowded out pri-
vate firms from both external and internal credit markets. 
This, combined with other factors, caused the economic down-
turn in the economy. Concurrently, the deficits, government 
" 
Table 3. Economic Performance Indicators for Costa Rica, 1960-1981 
External Debt~? 
Exchange Inflation Value of Change in External Commercial 
Year Rate Rate ImEorts ExEorts For. Ex. Res • Donors~/ Bank~/ 
Colones pir Wholesale --In Millions of Dollars--
$1 u.s~ Price Index 
1960 5. 64 6 llO 84 
1961 6.64 - 1 107 84 
1962 6.64 2 ll3 93 
1963 6.64 1 124 95 
1964 6.64 2 139 ll4 
1965 6.64 - 2 178 ll2 
1966 6.64 2 179 136 
1967 6.64 5 191 144 
1968 6.64 4 214 171 
1969 6.64 6 245 180 
1970 6.64 8 317 231 
1971 6.64 4 350 225 
1972 6.64 8 373 281 
1973 6.65 26 455 345 
1974 8.57 38 720 440 
197 5 8.57 14 694 493 
1976 8.57 7 770 593 
1977 8.57 7 1,021 828 
1978 8.57 9 1,166 865 
1979 8.57 24 1,397 934 
1980 14.25 22 1,540 1,002 
1981 35.80 82 l ,2ll 1,031 
a/ End of year official selling exchange rates. 
b/ Year end outstanding balances. 
cf Includes multilateral as well as bilateral acsistance. 
d/ Includes suppliers credits. 
e/ Preliminary figures as of October 1, 1981. 
- 3 24 4 
- 5 24 4 
5 45 16 
5 73 17 
2 81 23 
2 ll3 35 
- 2 124 37 
2 127 26 
10 148 17 
18 137 20 
- 16 131 33 
8 153 46 
2 178 59 
18 203 93 
- 23 251 128 
21 343 168 
65 430 216 
109 520 314 
- 41 632 412 
-106 7 59 639 
-204 1,087 648 
- 52 1,700 1,000~ 
Sources: Victor Hugo Cespedes and Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, "Growth and Equity: Income 
Distribution in Costa Rica," manuscript in process, September 1982; Victor Hugo 
Cespedes S. and others, Costa Rica: Una Economia en Crisis. San Jose, Costa Rica: 
Academia de Centroamerica, Dec. 1981; and Oficina de Planificacion Nacional y 
Politica Economia, Evolticion Socio Economica de Costa Rica, 1950-1980, San Jose, 
Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad Estatal A Distancia, 1982. 
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borrowings, and rapid increases in the money supply caused a 
sharp increase in the rate of inflation and capital flight 
from the country. 
An important factor that caused the government to 
resist adjusting exchange rates was the recently acquired, 
very large foreign debt obligation, one of the highest per 
capita in the world. Most of this debt was denominated in 
foreign currency. A devaluation of say 100 percent would 
have doubled the <lebt obligation in terms of the local 
currency. No government, especially one as heavily indebted 
as Costa Rica's, wants to face the very tough short run 
adjustments in government budgets required by massive 
increases in the debt service obligation. 
It is clear that international lenders loved Costa Rica 
nigh onto death. During the late 1970s Costa Rica should 
have increased its domestic savings, and followed trade 
policies aimed at encouraging a few efficient industries to 
emerge that could have been competitive in international 
markets. With a smaller overhang of foreign debt, and more 
efficient industries, it would have been easier for the 
government to make modest adjustments in the exchange rate 
to help manage some of the unanticipated shocks that occur 
to any small, relatively open economy. 
Dominican Republic's Financial Markets 
A large part of donor assistance moves through local 
financial markets. Its impacts are largely on the policies 
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years these rates have been well below the rates of infla-
tion. The rediscount facilities and the large amounts of 
external funds for credit also encourage financial inter-
mediaries to become heavily dependent on outside funds. 
Aside from a few branches of commercial banks, there are 
very few opportunities for rural residents in the Dominican 
Republic to place their savings in financial institutions. 
While authorized to do so, the Agricultural Bank accepts 
virtually no deposits in any of its more than 30 branches. 
Low interest rates make it very difficult for the 
financial system, even if it chooses to do so, to mobilize 
voluntary financial savings in rural areas. The low 
interest rates also make it impossible for a lending agency 
to cover its costs of lending, especially if it makes a 
large number of small loans to the rural poor. No lender, 
even if owned by the government, can expect to subsist inde-
finitely on a diet of subsidies to cover operating deficits. 
The political will to sustain these subsidies is transitory. 
The net result is that benefits of borrowing are con-
centrated in the hands of relatively few people, financial 
markets do a poor job of helping to allocate resources effi-
ciently, and the financial system takes on a patronal flavor 
(Ladman and Tinnermeier). The net result is that only 10-15 
percent of the farmers in the Dominican Republic have access 
to formal loans, agricultural lenders are on shaky financial 
grounds, and information flows within agricultural lenders 
• 
13 
that influence the performance of the financial market. 
These impacts can be grouped into four categories: (1) 
interest rate policies, (2) sources of funds used by the 
financial markets, (3) information flows within these 
markets, and (4) political intrusions into these markets. 
It is difficult through a single case to show the 
subtleties of how substantial donor intrusions affect finan-
cial intermediation. While far from being the worst case, 
the Dominican Republic does illustrate some of the problems 
associated with donor intrusions into rural financial 
markets. 
As can be noted in Table 4, since 1960 the funds 
handled by formal rural financial markets in the Dominican 
Republic have expanded rapidly, despite modest inflation, 
from 15 to over 240 million pesos. The growth in the volume 
of agricultural loans made by the Agricultural Bank has been 
especially impressive. Over the past two decades donor 
agencies have played a large role in this expansion. 
Through 1982 donor agencies have granted or lent for agri-
cultural credit purposes in the Dominican Republic about 150 
million dollars U.S. (Donor agencies have also been very 
important in the formation of several major segments of the 
agricultural credit system.) These large infusions of funds 
have allowed the government to sustain relatively low 
interest rates on both rural loans and savings. In recent 
14 
Table 4. Volume of Formal Agricultural Loan~ Made in 
The Dominican Republic, 1960-1981..!Y 
Agricultural Commercial Other Credit-to 
Year Tota~/ Bank Banks.£/ Lenders.£/ Outeut~/ 
--Millions of Pe sos~)--
1960 15. 3 12 3.3 0.06 
1962 14.1 11 3.1 0.05 
1964 29.0 24 5.0 0.11 
1966 33.5 21 12.2 0.3 0.13 
1968 42.5 25 15. 2 2.3 0.16 
1970 45.4 29 15. 5 0.9 0.13 
1972 54. 7 31 21.1 2.6 0.13 
1974 119.4 68 46.9 4.5 0.18 
1976 151. 9 81 61. 9 9.0 0.19 
1978 192.9 112 67.4 13.6 0.21 
1980 278.0 189 89.0 N/A o.29f/ 
1981 240.3 149 91.3 N/A N/A 
Ratios of 
Ag. Credit-to 
Total Credit 
0.20 
0.21 
0.20 
0.23 
o.2sY 
N/A 
a/ Does not include loans large firms may obtain outside the country (i.e. the 
sugar industry). 
b/ Excludes loans to the sugar industry. 
""I.I Includes loans made by the Dominican Development Foundation, IDECOOP, 
various financieras, ODC, and CARITAS. 
2_/ The official exchange rate is one peso for one U.S. dollar. The curb 
exchange rate has ranged between the official rate and 1.50 in recent 
years. 
el Output is value of total internal gross product from the agricultural 
sector. 
J./ Excludes financieras, ODC, CARITAS, DDF, IDECOOP. 
Sources: Banco Agricola de La Republica Dominicana, Boletin Estadistico, 
1981; Banco Central de La Republica Dominicana, Boletin Mensual 
various issues, and various unpublished reports by agencies making 
agricultural loans in the Dominican Republic. Also, USAID/DR, 
Agricultural Sector Strategy--Dominican Republic, 1980; and SEA, 
Plan de Desarrollo Agropecuario 1980-82, 1979. 
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are warped toward meeting donor objectives rather than pro-
viding information for efficient management. 
Conclusions 
Because of fungibility, it is very difficult to sort 
shadow from reality in foreign aid (Tendler). While I feel 
that foreign assistance should be continued, I am very con-
cerned about how large amounts of capital or commodity 
assistance affect agricultural prices, exchange rates, and 
interest rates. It is becoming increasingly clear that 
faulty internal price policies, not the lack of foreign 
assistance, is the major factor causing many low income 
countries to falter. To the extent that foreign aid helps 
reinforce these damaging policies, more donor assistance 
will be part of the problem not part of the solution. A 
major challenge facing the foreign aid enterprise is to 
reposition aid activities so they encourage appropriate 
changes in these misguided policies. 
• 
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